Courts must audit and then screen out viable but failing firms after their filing for bankruptcy. Yet the judgment and its decision process remain a black box. The bankruptcy literature claims it is an optimal arbitrage between the going concern and the liquidation value. Deviations from the efficient judgment should be mainly explained because of the characteristics of the legal system through its tradition or its orientation. The main concern of the literature is to determine how these characteristics affect the efficiency of the decision. The aim of this paper is to challenge these models and to consider another factor, the local environment. The paper switches from the usual perspective and focuses on the Courts rather than on the legal system. It assumes this institution takes into account the local unemployment rate to decide whether a firm should survive or not. Possible explanations by the bankruptcy literature are tested -rational behavior, the firms are more viable when there is an increase of local unemployment rate; strict application of national orientation, the effect is drawn by national economic climate; over-interpretation of law, judges try to promote social efficiency in their decisions; or another explanation, a behavioral bias due to political beliefs or network issues. The analysis is based an original dataset of all Redressement Judiciaire -French main continuation proceeding -since 2006. Through several tests -using survival analysis in a competing risk setting, the paper assesses only the behavioral bias seems to hold. It underlines that Courts are locally embedded institutions which protect the firms under their jurisdiction against local turmoil. This effect is found to be detrimental on the survival of these prolonged firms.
Introduction
Bankruptcy results from a breach in contract from a debtor and the resort to Court to find and enforce a solution. The literature underlines as a main difference with usual contractual issue the number and the different classes of creditors and understates the role of Courts. Authors question how the characteristics of the system affects the efficiency of the process. The efficient solution is mostly defined as maximizing the bankrupt firm's value. In this scenario, Court is reduced to a black box. They must focus on an efficient screening out between firms that should reorganized from the ones that are not viable.
The characteristics of the legal system are understood as a national level with two main angles, legal orientation (Frouté (2007) ) and most commonly legal tradition (La Porta et al. (1996) ). The focus is rather on the onset of bankruptcy and not on its aftermath where the Court's decisions are crucial though the latter question is growing in the litterature. This paper offers to switch from the usual questions. To do so, it tries to assess whether the Court should be modelled concordingly to most papers as a screening device -knowing their decision may depend on characteristics of national law -or whether they follow a different agenda.
To understand how Court's decisions affect bankruptcy, one needs to look at the two motives when filing for bankruptcy: the wish to terminate the firm seen as unviable or conversely to pursue its activity. Each country offers a menu of proceedings that correspond these two motives: in the U.S. the Chapter 11 for the continuation and the Chapter 7 for the termination; in France, the Redressement or the Sauvegarde and the Liquidation. In most countries, the reorganization procedures aim to promote the firm's survival in the shareholders' hands by restructuring the firm's debts.
But the filing only does not ensure the success of the procedure. It is only after an auditing and a successful negotiation with the creditors a reorganization plan can be agreed upon. Several outcomes can arise if the bargaining fails: the firm's can survive but in the hands of new shareholders -after a sale as a going concern -or the complete failure of the proceeding and conversion to a piecemeal liquidation. The success or failure of the proceeding is largely due to the Court because of the weight they are given in France to promote their decisions. French bankruptcy judges are in a similar situation with the U.S. with the "cram down" provision. Their motivations in the judgment process are therefore all the more relevant.
The literature offers multiple possible motives in Courts' behaviour. They may operate as screening device looking for the outcome that maximizes the firm's value as in Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) or Hart (2000) . They could be swayed by the orientation of the national law, which can more or less promote the preservation of firms' activity. They could also be challenged in their decisions by the legal tradition of the law, Silanes, La Porta, and Schleifer (2008) note in civil law countries case law is supposed to be less common and judges may be less incline to deviate from the national law.
This papers attempts to question these different theories with a thesis inspired by the "local legal culture" literature as stated by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1994) . Apparent "errors" in judicial outcomes should be mostly explained by individual responses and not by mistakes from Courts. In this paper, the main assumption is that bankruptcy Courts are sensitive to their local environment, in particular to the local unemployment. The judges are aware the decision to liquidate a firm should impact the local economy of their juridiction. Furthermore in France most of bankruptcy judges are not professional judges but elected among local executives and entrepreneurs 1 . This specific status is supposed to help them better understand business issues than legal experts. It should also imply them being more sensitive to economic conditions. Due to this, it is assumed in the paper Courts protect firms of their jurisdiction in time of economic turmoil. The aim is then to identify a positive relation between increase of local unemployment rate and the conclusion of a continuation plan. It will proove the local concern of Courts. A negative relation would imply for the local unemployment rate to be a proxy for the firm's local perspective
The effect of local unemployment is tested with a survival analysis model on the different outcomes after filing. The sample focuses on the French main reorganization procedures, the Redressement Judiciaire proceeding. An increase in local unemployment rate also increases the transition hazard of agreeing on a reorganization plan. And this resulds holds after several controls testing the different possible motivation of bankruptcy Courts. This paper offers three major findings. It brings in the law and economics literature new insight on the way judges judge. This puts into question the first approximation in the literature assuming the judicial decisions are black boxes. The legal tradition litterature is offered a counter-argument on the constraints it assumes on the judge in a Civil law country -whose room of decision is supposed to be limited by the lack of case law. It finally questions how these deviations from the theory impact the economy and reinserts Courts not only as judicial promoter -enhancing law -but also as political institutions.
The paper is first concerned by how the literature questions bankruptcy outcomes and judges' decision process (Section 2). The third part describes the data (Section 3) which are analysed in the next section (Section 4). The last section presents the models used in the paper and the results on two samples, the overall population and the firms with available Balance sheet (Section 5).
Bankruptcy outcome decisions in the literature
Bankruptcy literature questions the process of judicial decisions but mostly not directly, rather as a side concern. The literature either attemps to identify this process as a costly solution aiming for an optimal decision; or alternatively how the Court's functioning and decisions depends on the characteristics of the legal system. A few authors in law and economics have studied judgments as the decisions by individuals and defend the notion of "local legal culture". This section allows for considering how each of this trend of the literature may describe the judgment process and how it may be impacted by local unemployment.
Many papers describe bankruptcy as a costly response to the failure of the market solution -bargaining with creditors. The need for an external neutral agent -most of the time a Court -arises from the need to enforce the breached contract when private workouts fail. Blazy, Martel, and Nigam (2010) or Haugen and Senbet (1978) and Haugen and Senbet (1988) list some limits: asymmetry of information between agents, the risk of credit run but also free riders behavior by some class of creditors. Authors in this trend try to value the costs of bankruptcy -direct and indirect -and the relative costs between countries 2 .
In this set of literature, the Court's role is to evaluate the firm's going concern value relative to its liquidation's. The firm's environment and its local economy can only be used as approximations for the firm's prospects. It should have no effect once the firm's viability and prospects are controlled for. Many kinds of sectorial variables are used, either market-wide -such as in Partington and Kim (2008) or in Hoi Fung Ng (2007) ; or industry-wide such as in Ayadi-Ben Lakhal (2011) or even economic-wide such as in Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra (2012) . None of the papers add a geographical concern to these variables. What's more, all the mentioned papers look at the bankruptcy outcome after filing and none questions a possible relation between the environment variable and the judicial process. This approach is the most common stance in empirical papers.
Two lines of research relates the environment and the bankruptcy decision : legal tradition and law orientation. Starting with White's seminal paper White (1989) on the judicial process after a Chapter 11 filing, the literature has deviated from their effect on filing and questioned how the legal system's characteristics modify the bankruptcy outcomes. The environment under study here is restricted to a legal one.
The literature on legal tradition was initiated by World Bank economists La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,Schleifer and Vishny 3 . This typology is based on an empirical relation between efficiency and legal origin. It states that Civil Law systems tend to be less efficient than Common Law particularly in enforcing property rights, especially with French Civil Law tradition. Largely debated 4 , this criterion is often used to compare the relative efficiency of legal national characteristics. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) explains this feature with the rigidity of law in Civil law countries 5 . Conversely to Common law, case law is not as available which restrict judges in their decision. In this framework, judges in a Civil Law country such as France should apply the law as predicted in the civil code. There may be an impact of unemployment on decisions but local deviations are not to be expected. The model assumes a common behaviour from all judges across the country.
The orientation of law should bind Courts in their judgments. The question of this literature also relies on the relative efficiency of a system versus another. The cost/benefit of each orientation is hard to tell 6 . White (1996) opposes three kind of effects differing with the orientation of law, punishment, gambling and delay effect plus the type of errors promoted in the screening of firms 7 . In this literature, judges are straightfully affected by the national law. They remain agents trying to optimally screen out between firms but are exogneously affected. As for the legal tradition argument, no local deviation is to be expected. Some authors Blazy et al. (2009) showed that the orientation of law may be more specific, i.e. in line with the objectives set by the law. In the French case, the law prioritizes the protection of employment, the firm's activity pursue and 3 Henceforth, LLSV. 4 see for example Vilanova (2007) or Levratto (2009) 5 They consider a different historical role of state in the society and an its intervention on the judicial system. Courts were thus more or less independent at the time and the existence of a civil code to follow should make them less independent nowadays in a Civil Law system. 6 see Ayotte and Yun (2009) link the orientation with judicial expertise in order to be efficient; Frouté (2007) model shows how pro-debtor system encourage firms to file for the fittest proceeding; or Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra (2012) insist on the effect of orientation on "firms [...] not in financial distress (ex ante efficiency), those in financial distress but have not filed for bankruptcy (interim efficiency)" 7 Type I error mean viable firms being liquidated rather than continued ; Type II means conversely helping firms continue that should be shut down, also called "continuation bias" last the write-off of debts. They found the French outcomes are better explained by a social efficiency notion than an economic one. Judges may apply the law by following as objective function the aims sponsored by the law. The unemployment rate could provide an incentive for judges to stress out continuation rather than liquidation. In this case, judges may be sensitive to the evolution of local unemployment as a sign to increase their attention on the first aim of the French law. Yet they should be first concerned by firms with the highest number of employees. The effect of local unemployment should not be evenly distributed depending on the firm's size.
In all these solutions, judges are not considered as individuals but as benevolent actors. They only try implementing an optimal screening out between firms. They may be affected exogeneously by the national law or their screening may also pursue other objectives such as the safeguard of employment. In the local legal culture literature, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1994) consider that judges behave not accordingly to the law's orientation. The authors show that unpredicted outcomes in personal bankruptcy cases cannot be fully grasped with the usual models. With a similar approach, this paper looks at other motives in Courts' decisions by enquiring the effect of local unemployment. The local legal culture literature is at the frontier between sociology and economics. In Lazega and Mounier (2009) , authors attend interviews with most of the judges in Paris Commercial Court. They show the judges' punitivity and interventionism in the judicial process vary strongly and can be linked with their past career. Though this literature assumes local deviations, it does not predict a similar rationale from each Courts. They depend mainly on the individuals that compose each Court. None of these references expect for Courts to show a similar behaviour as it is reckoned in this paper.
The thesis defended here is that Commercial Courts act as local institutions. Since the judges are local representatives, they adapt their decisions to the evolution in the local economy. This stance is in lune with the literature questioning the political use of bankruptcy. Ben-Ishai and Lubben (2011) for example state that Chapter 11 has been an efficient government tool to provide support to the automative industry. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2007) worked on the Russian Commercial Courts after the enforcement of the new 1998 bankruptcy law. They have demonstrated how the regional governor affected the decisions of the Courts because of how judges' career are dependent to these regional authorities. Both papers rehabilitate the political dimension of these decisions though it is supposed here that ' judgments are not swayed by the judges' motives but by the general system.
Data and explanatory variables

Data and sample
To test the motivations of bankruptcy judges, the question rests rather on the decisions after the firm hase filed i.e. whether the Court defends a continuation plan, the sale as a going concern or simply the liquidation of the firm. The model focuses on the filing and the successive transitions 8 . The data are drawn from all French juridictions. It covers all Redressement Judiciaire from the application of the last reform of bankruptcy law -the 1 st January 2006 -until the 31 st December 2012.
Data following bankruptcy from their onset are scarcely found. Two limits can be generally found in the literature: year-selection or sample selection. In the first case, only a few years of filing are analyzed in particular (Morrison (2007) or Warren and Westbrook (2007) and Warren and Westbrook (2008) or Levratto, Tessier, and Zouikri (2011) ) covering a longer period with the risk of strong bias selection depending on the economic climate. A few paper crossanalyzes several subsequent years, such as Denis and Rodgers (2007), Hoi Fung Ng (2007) or Ayadi-Ben Lakhal (2011) . Their downward is then the limits of their sample; either focused on a single jurisdiction (Paris for Ben-Lakhal, Chicago for Morrison) or on a short sample -only listed firms for Denis and Rodgers or Hoi Fung Ng.
In France, three potential legal sources can provide information on bankruptcy proceedings. ALTARES provided all events registered by these data sourcesthe official bulletin of civil and commercial notices (BODACC), the National Commercial Registry (RNCS) and legal notices 9 . A judgment opening must be settled in the 12 months after filing. Exceptionally, it can be twice prolonged, each time for 6 months. A filing should not last more than 24 months long without a decision from the Court. As such, the filings in the sample may last until 2 years and a half in order to encompass very special cases 10 . Since all filings are accounted for, it represents a total of 115, 749 filings for the time period.
The focus is on commercial firms. It rules out self-employed firms. They represent the second largest population filing into bankruptcy with a third of all filings in the period under study (see Table 2 ). Yet since attached to a living person, their SIRENE number is not changed after a closing. This may false the results in case a firm has filed more than once during the period. Plus they can reopen easily their active despite a previous bankruptcy so that they must be treated with a different perspective than commercial firms. The study focuses on the impact of local environment on the judicial decisions. The firms with no known salary are extreme cases, their judgment is expected to be less crucial, more in line with the classical arbitrage between going concern and liquidation value. This is why the study focuses only on firms with a known staff of one employee or more . Nine business sectors were selected for the sample 11 . They are the same used by the Banque de France for their statistics. These sectors gather the main productive sectors in France -construction, manufacturing and trade. It excludes public services, education, research and the art sector. It also excludes the food industry and the financial services that cannot be treated because they differ in their accounting and their bankruptcy treatment . To get enough financial hindsight, the firms with available financial information must have at least two balance sheet. For comparison reason, firms must be more than 2 years old. Most of public information on firms are given either by the national census bureau -Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) or the commercial registry (RNCS). The financial variables are given with the balance sheet. Though mandatory for most firms, more than half do not publish them and it specially depends on their business sector 12 . The availability of financial information can bias the results. The firms with available balance sheet tend to have lower default rate and higher chance of survival after default. Indeed, the scope in number of firms is far below The final first sample -sample A -boils down to more than half the entire population of commercial firms filing during the period. The second -sample B -stands for almost a fifth of the population and around a third of Sample A (see Table 3 ).
Explanatory variables
The question raised needs for a lot of controls of the decision by judges. Public information -available for all firms in the sample -is diverse. It gives the firm's age, its localization, its size (number of employees), its -new business or acquired for example -and so on. It also provides a classification of activity, NAF, with several levels of aggregation. The place and timing of filing allows to link a firm with its local environment and its evolution at a particular time.
Several environment variables are used -some on a sectorial level, other macroeconomic on a national and and most are local. For the sectorial variables, the Banque de France gives many financial ratios over time. There are average ratios on activity, profitability, income distribution, and solvability or payment manner. The ratios describe 9 distinct business sectors, on a yearly basis. These variables help stating whether a sector is dynamic or not. They also allow to distinguish between effect driven by local or sectorial issues. For instance, the decision to reorganize firms may seem linked with a increase in local unemployment but could be explained by the turmoil in an important business sector of an area.
For a macro perspective, INSEE provides the GDP growth over 12 months on a monthly basis and the national unemployment rate computed on a quaterly basis. Both variables control for the deviation of the unemployment rate at a local level.
The local environment of the firm is defined with two sets of variables: at Court-level and department-level. The first are concerned with the size and "orientation" of the Court. The Courts are associated with a defined perimeter on which firms depend and there can be several Commercial Courts but at least one for each department . Past bankruptcy cases for the last 12 months are computed with the share of each procedures: Sauvegarde, Redressement or direct Liquidation. For the department-level variables, local unemployment rate at 3 months is used. The creation rate of firms at 36 months -proxy of the local activity dynamics -is preferred. Most past studies show the delayed effect of firm creation on bankruptcy to be around 3 years. In order to have information on the local economic structure, the relative weight in numbers of each business sectors is used, aggregated with the NAF1 classification. If a firm belongs to a main sector in the department, this sector can be well-structured and influential. If the sector is scarcely represented, it may need to be protected or conversely a firm in this sector would hardly find a buyer in case of sale.
Summary Statistics
Statistics on events
National statistics on French bankruptcy state that Redressement Judiciaire procedures represent a third of all filings a year. From the filing for Redressement, 7 out of 10 cases fail to reorganize and are either converted into a Liquidation proceeding or even closed ; around 5 − 6% cases end up sold as a going concern and around one-fourth manage to agree on a continuation plan 13 .
The data used here provide similar figures for the bankruptcy outcomes. Sales as going concern are a little more represented with 7, 3% of cases. This can be explained by the selection of only commercial firms with at least one employees. The agreements for a continuation plan represent the same share, 24% of cases. The fact the figure remains the same is not surprising. For a selfemployed firm to undergo a continuation procedure means she is enough confident on its caseto stand the bankruptcy costs. The share of liquidation/closure is thus quite similar. 
Comparing population to firms with balance sheet available
Looking at the statistics by business sector in Table 5 , the firms in the sample do not show many differences except for the Manufacturing sector. The same statement applies for the staistics by legal form in Table 6 . Only the General Partnership legal form is widely more represented in sample B. The discrepancies rather lie within the size of the firms as shown in Table 7 . Only two-thirds of the firms in Sample B have less than 10 employees vs. nearly three quarters in Sample A. More than half firms with more than 50 employees have a balance sheet available. The availability of a balance sheet is the proof of a sounder situation, which can be namely explained by size issues. The firms with available balance sheet thus proove larger with a survival bias. The second sample will be used to confirm insights obtain with the whole population. The main adavantage from survival analysis is to integrate censored data, i.e. firms for which information on what happened after their filing is missing. Though extended to a six-year horizon, the time-coverage is not enough to follow all filings from thier onset to their closure, a continuation plan can last 10 years. All other staistical models would need assumption on these observations and thus would bias the results. On this methodological question, this paper chooses to borrow tools from biostatical research. The switch is from an usual mortality model (Hougaard (1999) ) already used in questioning bankruptcy outcomes (e.g. Denis and Rodgers (2007) ; Hoi Fung Ng (2007) to a model more befitting the trajectory in a judicial path -a competing risk setting 14 . In such setting, the termination date of a process is not reduced the transition to a single event -such as the usual life/death model -but rather the transition from a state to another among different alternatives. The firm files and can then be continued through a reorganization plan; sold as a going concern or be liquidated and sold piecemeal . This last approach has been used to model the aftermath of continuation plans (Ayadi-Ben Lakhal, 2011) to determine whether the firms end up being sold, closed or if it manages to survive. In order for the variables to be treated the most accordingly to the situation, authors stress the need to take into account all possible alternatives (Beyersmann, Allignol, and Schumacher (2012) ,or Astebro and Winter (2012) in the case of bankruptcy). This would be impossible in a two-alternative model. For instance, the size of the firm is known to influence the trajectory. The probability to agree on a continuation plan increase with the firm's size until a threshold where the firm is most probably sold. Such models seem the most well suited to understand the decision process and compare the logic of the choice of liquidation rather than continuation or sale. Competing risk setting assumes a competition between the alternatives. Indeed, there is a competition in the timing of each alternative: after filing, creditors, suppliers, customers and even employees do not know whether the firm will be continued, sold or liquidated. As such it affects the activity and the survival and the trajectory of the firm.
Semi-parametric analysis
The most commonly used model in survival analysis is doubtlessly Cox model. It models the hazard rate assuming two components: a non-parametric part called baseline hazard, λ Oj (t) -and a parametric component with the covariates, Z.
The main assumption of this model is the Proportionality Hypothesis. This implies that the relative hazard rates of two different individual is solely explained by the parametric part of the model. The difference in hazard rate 15 between two firms only depend on the variables tested in the model. In equation, this means that for (k, l) two different individuals, we have:
Several methods exist to test for this assumption. The main used is a graphical approach combined with an analysis of the Schoenfeld residuals. In most tested models, the Courts' dummies variable deviate from this assumption. To resolve this issue, the models are stratified with the Courts as strata. The coefficients of the hazard functions are not dependent on the strata, i.e. on the Courts, only the baseline hazard depends on this distinction. The drawback of this model is the risk of a decrease in the significance of coefficients. It also supposes that the variables have similar effects across the strata. The assumption of a different baseline hazard for each Court is also coherent with the general stance of the paper to study effect of a same variable on Courts.
In this paper, the assumption is that firms in a jurisdiction are somehow judged in a similar way. Some local variables are tested for but first, they are computed at a department level and not at a court level 16 ; furthermore, no other characteristics but past judgments are used. This paper assumes a correlation between firms from a same juridiction and is short on Courts' charactertistics.
Survival analysis has models to take into account the effect of subgroups in the duration process called shared-frailty model (Hougaard (1999) ; Rondeau and Gonzalez (2005) ). These models are well suited in the case of different center of trials with possible different performance of each center. As such, the model fits well this paper's goal to understand the weight of local environment. They are particularly useful for assuming unobserved heterogeneity between the trial centers. To do so, they use a parametric multiplicative component in the hazard rate. Though the method has been argued for a systematic use, it is well performing in case of recurrent events for a same individual or a common effect for individual belonging to same groups. These models have been studied by Hougaard (1999) or Therneau and Grambsch (2000) .
Formally, the hazard rate -assuming a similar form than in a Cox modelcan be written as follow,
The heterogeneity effect is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution of θ parameter. The higher its variance, the higher the cluster effect is to explain the evolution on the hazard rate. Due to this assumptions, these models are also more sensitive to correlation issues than the original Cox models.
Testing for the impact of local unemployment with
Court as optimal screener
A first naive model
The analysis of the potential effect of local unemployment on bankruptcy decisions starts with a simple "naive" model. The results are reported in Table   16 They may be several Courts for a same department 8. The aim is to compare the coefficients with the sign expected with models assuming Courts are "optimal and benevolent screener". An increase in local unemployment rate strongly and significantly increases the chance for a firm to enter a reorganization plan. This result may indicate judges do not prioritize the screening out of firms. Since the model control for the general economic condition with the GDP growth, judgements should not be impacted. At least even if one consider there is not enough macroeconomic controls, local unemployment should inform of tightened economic condition on the local firm's market. Acknowledging local unemployment as a proxy for adverse economic conditions, the impact on the alternative of reorganization should be negative and strongly positive for liquidation.
The negative and significant coefficient associated with the GDP growth on the transition towards a continuation plan confirms that bankruptcy judges appear to act as a contracyclical policy. This statement must be challenged by a non-significant yet negative coefficient associated with GDP growth but on the transition towards liquidation. Still, the transition towards liquidation suffers negatively from an increase in th share of the number of direct Liquidation in the past 12 months. This may be driven by uncontrolled for variable and the effect though significant is not really strong.
The possible effect on the sale as a going concern transition is theoretically less straightforward. An increase in local unemployment should reduce the going concern value, thus its price. It should also reduce the prospects of local firms thus their purchasing ability. There is a high chance for information about bankrupt firm to be more available to other local firms. If the behaviour as optimal screener is not expected, there is also the possibility that judges are reluctant to sell firms with an increase in local unemployment. There is a high chance for employees to be laid off in the buyer's plan. The negative coefficient found in Table 8 is not infirming a theory from another.
Only the size of the Court proxied by the number of past proceedings suggests that Court are not swayed by their environment. It indicates there is a persistence in their behaviour even if their jurisdiction is worse off. Still, the lack of controls do not allow to really test this variable. The other variables do not contradict either theory on Court's behaviour. The expected sign with the share of the firm's sector in the department is ambiguous. It probably depends on a threshold relative to each business sector. Up to a point, the increase of a particular sector should not affect other firms in this sector. Once again, this model lacks for control to be sure. At least, the "Depaysement" dummy 17 is intriguing. Its large and significant impact on the transition to sale as going concern indicates that firms anticipates the judgement of their dedicated Court and behave conformly.
Testing with controls for sectors' and firms' characteristics
The theoretical role of judges in bankrupcty literature does not allow them to be impacted by local unemployment in their decisions.The naive model presented in the previous section indicate the reverse but as already mentioned, it displays not enough control variables. In order to approximate the decision model of Courts, two models are tested: with firm's and sector's characteristics which results are reported in Table 9 and then adding financial information in Table  10 .
As shown in section 4, the firms with available financial information present a selection bias. In order to solve this bias, the paper checks the effect with a two fold test. First, the impact of local unemployment is tested on the overall population. The second part is a test on the reduced population with balance sheet. The second test is thus a checkout from the first conclusion.
In both models local unemployment rate displays the same sign and level of significance -at the 1% level -to explain transition towards Continuation Plan. This results holds despite the number of controls and imply that the theory of Courts modeled deviate from their role of screening. The coefficients is even higher in the second model but this could be due to a difference in the firms' size in the samples. This assumption is coherent with the stronger negative coefficient in Table 10 associated with sale as a going concern. Indeed, the largest bankrupt firms are generally sold 18 . Only the transition to Liquidation rests ambiguous, the coefficient in the model without financial controls is positive but looking at the standard errors imply for the 95% confidence interval stands Note: the profile controls consists on the firm's location, its business sector, age, its origin of creation, its legal form, its size in number of employees; the sectorial ratios consists on the weights of labour and debts and their variation, the variation in DSO and DPO, and the variation in profitability.
below and above 0. In the other model, the coefficient is this time negative, but once again the value of the standard error does not allow to draw any conclusions. To sum up, the two Cox models show that the decision of Courts are truly affected but it is overall in favouring Continuation plans and to avoid sale as a going concern.
Most of the other coefficients in the models stay coherent with the results of the naive model. The effect of GDP growth on liquidation versus continuation plan is amplified in the models using financial ratios controls. The coefficient is negative for both transition but such a result is not necessarily contradictory. As hazard rate, Cox model may be interpretated as time process. Thus when the economy is down, negotiations to reach a continuation plan are extended while decisions to liquidate the firm are shortened. And this appears to be all the more true when financial information are checked for. Yet this may also be due to the selection bias in the second sample.
The effect of the composition of past judgments is the most surprising. The effect of past Liquidation and past Sauvegarde in sample B is opposite to the effect on the overall population. The effect is close to 0 in the case of the former, but it is of 2, 9% on liquidation for the latter. It suggests that the more Sauvegarde openings in the last 12 months, the more the Courts are inclined to convert Redressement into Liquidation proceeding. It implies there is a possible substitution effect between both procedures in the judges' minds. Still, the positive coefficient associated to the variable for the continuation and the sale as going concern transition -though not significant -lead to think that the effect is rather on the length of the proceeding rather than in the choice between both alternatives.
At last, the "Dépaysement" dummy effect is getting logical when all controls are applied. In Table 9 , the decision to change of Court appears ill-advised. As in the naive model though the chances to being sold remain high, the chances of being liquidated are increased while those of confirming a plan are decreased. It is only when the financial variables are controlled that the effect becomes logical despite not being significant. The chances of survive through a plan or a sale are increased while the impact on liquidation is close to 0.
Testing for the local deviation
This test is an extension from the findings of the last section. Local unemployment rate has proven to be part of the judges' decisions. All the previous models also attempted to test whether this result was only locally-driven or if it could be also driven by the national context. In models assuming Courts' behaviour is explained through legal tradition or the general orientation of law, it is this last issue that is foremost to be ruled out. Even if Courts integrate the local unemployment in their decision, this could be a sign of the legal context and orientation of law, not a complete challenge of their main role as optimal screener.
In order to make clear whether these decisions are local deviations, this section tests the impact of the gap between local and national level of unemployment rate. Results are reported in table 11. They confirmed the idea of a local deviation from the judges: the chances of going to a continuation plan actually increases when the local unemployment rate gets larger than the national's. The coefficient associated with the liquidation transition though positive re- Note: the profile controls consists on the firm's location, its business sector, age, its origin of creation, its legal form, its size in number of employees; the sectorial ratios consists on the weights of labour and debts and their variation, the variation in DSO and DPO, and the variation in profitability; the financial variables consists on the firm's profitability ratio and its variation, DSO and DPO and their variation, the financial coverage ratio and variation, the firm's liquidity, the weight of labour and indebtment, the variation in indebtment Note: the profile controls consists on the firm's location, its business sector, age, its origin of creation, its legal form, its size in number of employees; the sectorial ratios consists on the weights of labour and debts and their variation, the variation in DSO and DPO, and the variation in profitability.
mains non-significant and close to 0. For the Sale transition, the coefficient is highly negative, proving that the preservation mechanism mentioned above seems to be increasingly important with the wider the gap gets. The coefficients of the other variables are in line with what was found in table 9. Though not reported in here, the same model was tested on the second sample with financial information. The results were the same as for table 10. As in this last table, the coefficients associated with Liquidation was negative but still non-significant. The conclusion must still focuses on the two other alternatives. The test confirms there are local deviations in the judicial decisions. Courts do deviate in their behaviour accordingly to the specificty of the unemployment rate in their jurisdiction. The usual criticisms against Civil Law countries need to be questioned. The assumed rigidity of the legal system does not prevent judges to be sensitive to their local context and to probably follow other agenda than the Civil code's.
Testing for a different effect of local unemployment rate with firm's size
The last test insisted on the local dimension of the Court's decisions. As such it reevaluates the ability of judges in a Civil Law country -whatever the general orientation of law -to differ in their judgment from the Civil code. In the French case where law insists on the priority to protect the employees, the integration of local unemployment rate in the judgment may be a way for judges to respect this orientation. In this case, the effect should increase with the size of the firm in number of employees. The comparison in the coefficients of local unemployment rate between Tables 9 and 10 suggested that there may be a different impact depending on the size of firms. The test here is to find a monotonic increase in the effect with the number of employees. To test this effect, Cox model allows to integrate interaction terms 19 . The test is on the interaction between local unemployment rate and the number of employees. Its results are reported in the Table 12. Except for the transition to Sale for 50 to 250 employee firms, no result in this test is significant. In this case the impact of local unemployment is really strong conversely to firms that are over 250 employees where the coefficient associated to their size is already high (1.6) and significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for the continuation transition are harder to read but the low level of the coefficients associated with the interaction term proves that To fully understand the judgment process by Courts here the model should also test the different propositions by the current shareholders and the potential buyers as they are provided in Blazy and Firmayer ().
Testing effect of local unemployment rate considering a local legal culture
As mentioned in the first section, Cox model can add a multiplicative component in order to take into account heteregenous unobserved effect based on a 19 The reading differ from most models. The impact, β impact of an increase of t points of the unemployment rate on firms with 10 to 50 employees would be e β impact = e β 10to50empl. * 1 10to50empl. +β interactionterm * t . Note: the profile controls consists on the firm's location, its business sector, age, its origin of creation, its legal form, its size in number of employees; the sectorial ratios consists on the weights of labour and debts and their variation, the variation in DSO and DPO, and the variation in profitability.
cluster. Since the goal here is to model the decision of Courts in a juridiction, only past behaviour and the volume of judgments is accounted for. Furthermore, the model assumes a part of autocorrelation in judgments: there is a supposed common pattern in a specific Court's behaviour and past Liquidation proceedings -direct or after a conversion -are what result in an increase of unemployment.
Since frailty models are sensitive to correlation issues, the variables were reviewed to fit this constraint. That is why, as reported in Table 13 , the share of firms from the same business sector as well as the number of past bankruptcies and the share of Sauvegarde proceedings were dropped out, as well as the firm's age. Another important feature of these models is to allow to test for its assumption, i.e. there is a heterogeneous effect depending on each Court that affects the judgment. To do so, the multiplicative component is assumed to follow a Gamma law with a coefficient θ. As shown in the table, for all transitions the coefficient is found to be strong and significant. As guessed from the previous tests, the characteristics of the Court are the more prone to affect judgement towards Continuation plan, then Sale as a going concern, and lastly conversion in Liquidation. This test validates the results of Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1994) and the existence of a local legal culture in the sense that characteristics -unobserved here -impact the decisions made. The goal is to find despite this unobserved characteristics a persistence of local unemployment to explain decisions.
When interpretating the coefficients, the signs and level of significance are close from what has been found until now. The impact of the local unemployment rate is smaller (4.6% vs. 8.7% in Table 9 ) but still significant -at a 5% level but still three times higher to the coefficient associated to a Liquidation transition, which remains non-significant. For the Sales as a going concern transition, the coefficient remains significant and negative though weaker (−7.7% vs. −9.3% in Table 9 ). This is in line with results presented in the past sections. It confirms that Courts despite their judgments depending on their characteristics take into account their local environment to decide on the future of a bankrupt firm.
As before, the test was also attempted on firms with available balance sheet. Yet the number of firms with the transition towards a sale as going concern is too scarce to be applied this method. For the two other transitions, the signs and level of significance are almost identical. the effect of local unemployment rate on the transition to liquidation remains non-significant and low -around 1.7% -while the effect on the transition to continuation remains around three times larger (4.5%) with a 5% level of error. Both modes's frailty parameters remain significant but the gap between both model widens. The parameter in the continuation model reaches 24% while it decreases to 2.7% with both of them significant at the 1% level. This increasing difference between the two parameters can be explained by the size bias between the two sample but most probably because of the integration of financial variables. Controlling for them, the decision to liquidate a firm is easily explained with rational reasons given by the financial state of the firm. In the case of the continuation plan, the impact of rational arguments is decreased in favor of the context -as proven by the impact of the local unemployment. Note: the profile controls consists on the firm's location, its business sector, its origin of creation, its legal form, its size in number of employees; the sectorial ratios consists on the weights of labour and debts and their variation, the variation in DSO and DPO, and the variation in profitability.
Conclusion
Despite the number of tests done throughout the paper to control any issue arising, the local unemployment rate proved to affect the decision of French Courts after a firm has filed into Redressement Judiciaire. No existing theory in th bankruptcy field allows to understand this deviation. It is neither because of the legal system -in its orientation or tradition -nor the wish for preserving employment in th French bankruptcy law, nor it is a noise derived from the Court's characteristics. It is most probably the result of Courts being not only auditor of bankrupt firms but also political institutions of their jurisdiction. All the tests presented in the paper join in assessing this voluntary deviation. They are inclined to do so because of two features provided by French law: they are elected among professionals from their jurisdiction and the role of French Courts in the bankruptcy process. The main conclusion is that Courts deviate locally from their role as optimal screener. This is superimposed with the observed deviations due to the general orientation of law. Yet this behavior is potentially integrated by the creditors even on a local level. Also its effect may not be negative for the economy. The ability of Courts to screen out depend mainly from their ability to reveal the valur of firms -their going concern value relative to their liquidation's. The more the local economy deviates from its normal conditions or even from the national context, the more it must be challenging to derive a firm's value. By delaying the decisions, Courts may act because of political motives without harming the long term economic context.
The main challenge of this paper is to question the behaviour of Courts and with that, the assumption that Courts look for efficient solutions in their decisions. It is important to underline how the notion of efficiency itself is controversial in the literature. There are multiple arguments on its definition. For example the literature on law orientation assumes that pro-continuation systems should be hindered by their "continuation bias" some authors attempt to prove wrong this critics of against the orientation of the U.S. system. Morrison (2007) or Warren and Westbrook (2007) and Warren and Westbrook (2008) have proven the high screening ability of the American Courts. They do not proove this definition should be questioned, but even the perimeter of its typology need to be questioned.
The significant impact of local economy restates that Courts are obviously embedded in the local economic tissue. They are driven by other issues than the enforcement of law alone or the tradeoff between going concern and liquidation values. These findings are all the more concerning at a time of bankruptcy reform, especially since they tend to inspire from Chapter 11 that gives an important weight to the Court. For instance, Germany and Spain have inserted "cram-down" procedures, i.e. possibility for Courts to force their decisions, and thus heightening the latter's power. France is also currently debating its future reform. As shown in the MP mission, there are big concerns on the structure of Court to favor; the need for professional judges rather than only local professionals was in question.
These results are also linked with the French situation and the weight of Court in the decision. Yet local variables may still remain significant in systems where Courts are limited to an auditing function such as the English one. For instance, creditors with many implantations on a certain perimeter such as a regional bank should also be aware of the local climate. Thus, they must also care not to propagate financial difficulties among their customers. Therefore, there is a need for testing these assumptions on different legal systems. driven procedure and, what's more, Sauvegarde only account for around 1,5 % of all proceedings.
The Redressement as the Liquidation needs for the firm to be insolvent 20 for less than 45 days. At the filing the firm is managed by a representative of the Court and the Court itself makes all the following decisions. As such, the French system and in particular the Redressement offer a polar case of Courtmanaged proceeding that can fully illustrate how exogenous variables influence the decisions. 20 Insolvency is defined in France as "the impossibility of being able to meet liabilities due from available assets".
